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A B S T R A C T   
We frequently experience feelings of agency over events we do not objectively influence – so-called ‘illusions of 
control’. These illusions have prompted widespread claims that we can be insensitive to objective relationships 
between actions and outcomes, and instead rely on grandiose beliefs about our abilities. However, these illusory 
biases could instead arise if we are highly sensitive to action-outcome correlations, but attribute agency when 
such correlations emerge simply by chance. We motion-tracked participants while they made agency judgements 
about a cursor that could be yoked to their actions or follow an independent trajectory. A combination of signal 
detection analysis, reverse correlation methods and computational modelling indeed demonstrated that ‘illu-
sions’ of control could emerge solely from sensitivity to spurious action-outcome correlations. 
Counterintuitively, this suggests that illusions of control could arise because agents have excellent insight into 
the relationships between actions and outcomes in a world where causal relationships are not perfectly de-
terministic.   
1. Introduction 
False beliefs about action are a common feature of mental illness. 
Gambling addicts often believe that they can affect random games of 
chance (Clark, 2010; Gadboury & Ladouceur, 1989), and patients in the 
throes of psychosis can develop grandiose delusions about the influence 
they have over the external world (Knowles et al., 2011; Smith et al., 
2005). However, decades of research in the cognitive sciences has re-
vealed that healthy individuals also frequently experience ‘illusions of 
control’ over events that they do not objectively influence (Langer, 
1975). For example, we tend not to realise when we push ‘placebo 
buttons’ attached to pre-programmed traffic crossings, elevators and 
office thermostats (Luo, 2004), which may reflect exaggerated ex-
pectations about control (Moore, 2016). Moreover, classic studies have 
demonstrated that participants reliably over-report being in control of a 
flashing lightbulb, even when the flashes are programmed to occur 
randomly (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; see also Matute et al., 2019;  
Vázquez, 1987; Yarritu et al., 2014), and recent work suggests agents 
often believe their actions can stabilise objectively volatile environ-
ments they are interacting with (Weiss et al., 2019). 
Such illusions have prompted widespread claims that agents are 
often insensitive to the objective contingencies between actions and 
outcomes, and instead rely on grandiose beliefs about the extent to 
which they influence the outside world. While nonveridical, such 
grandiose beliefs are argued to be adaptive in a number of ways. For 
example, exaggerated beliefs about agency may be an important feature 
of healthy self-esteem (Bandura, 2002) – a point underscored by the 
fact that illusions of control are attenuated in depression (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979; Presson & Benassi, 2003; Vázquez, 1987). At the same 
time, evolutionary simulations have suggested that creatures with un-
realistically optimistic beliefs about their actions may enjoy a fitness 
advantage over populations with unbiased insight (Johnson & Fowler, 
2011), particularly in environments where overestimations are not 
particularly costly (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). Bayesian models of 
learning and control have also suggested that agents possessing pessi-
mistic beliefs about the controllability of the world miss out on rewards 
they could have reaped, but those with grandiose beliefs do not suffer 
(Huys & Dayan, 2009). 
However, there is also widespread evidence that humans can be 
highly sensitive to the objective contingencies between actions and 
their consequences. For example, explicit judgements of causality 
(Dickinson et al., 1984) and agency (Sato, 2009), along with implicit 
markers of action-outcome learning (Elsner & Hommel, 2004), increase 
as contingencies between actions and events become stronger. Similar 
patterns are seen in ‘intentional binding’ experiments, where shifts in 
subjective time perception are used as an implicit marker of the sense of 
agency (Haggard et al., 2002; Moore et al., 2009; Moore & Haggard, 
2008). Against this backdrop, we suggest a potential alternative 
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explanation for illusions of control – that these experiences arise be-
cause agents are especially sensitive to relationships between actions 
and outcomes and pick up on those that occur purely by chance. In 
naturalistic environments, action-outcome correlations are frequently 
imperfect even when we are in control. For instance, our actions may 
truly affect the behaviour of a temperamental friend, but these effects 
may not be perfectly predictable. In experimental settings, although 
experimenters can know exactly whether a participant is controlling an 
event, participants themselves can usually only base these decisions on 
experienced correlations. As such, a sensitive observer might detect 
correlations in random noise that spuriously resemble situations of 
control, and therefore experience feelings of agency. 
A key difference between this sensitivity hypothesis and accounts 
based on grandiose beliefs is the idea that illusions of control depend on 
the presence of signal-like noise, instead of a tendency to judge that one 
is in control irrespective of the evidence. This point can be demon-
strated by analogy to perceptual decision making, where observers 
detect weak signals embedded in noise. In such tasks observers often 
falsely report that stimuli were present when faced with pure sensory 
noise (Green & Swets, 1966). Classic theories assumed that these ‘false 
alarms’ were strategic guesses (Swets et al., 1961). However this as-
sumption has been questioned by recent work revealing that false 
alarms tend to occur when observers experience sensory noise that 
spuriously resembles the target (Wyart et al., 2012). Under these cir-
cumstances, a false alarm is completely rational, since observers have 
no way of distinguishing ‘true’ signals from signal-like noise (Green & 
Swets, 1966; Kloosterman et al., 2019; Wyart et al., 2012). 
We suggest that illusions of control could arise in a conceptually 
similar fashion – without any grandiose biases, agents may experience 
feelings of agency when they detect objectively uncontrolled events 
that correlate with their actions due to random environmental fluc-
tuations. This alternative explanation has been overlooked when the-
orising about the adaptive nature of illusions of control and their var-
iation in different populations. As a proof-of-concept we conducted an 
experiment where participants made agency judgements about an ob-
served cursor that could be spatiotemporally yoked to their actions 
(‘control’ trials) or follow an independent trajectory (‘no control’ trials). 
This task allowed us to dissociate objective sensitivity to agency from 
general biases to report control. We also applied reverse correlation 
techniques, calculating the spatiotemporal correlation between ob-
served and executed movements on each trial and using this to predict 
the given response (‘agency’ or ‘no agency’). We examined whether 
sensitivity to these spurious correlations was sufficient to generate ‘il-
lusions’ of control (i.e., biases) and simulated and modelled task per-
formance to investigate whether unbiased agents may nonetheless ex-
hibit illusions of control. 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
The final sample for this study comprised 48 adults (27 women, 21 
men; mean [SD] age 23 [4.5] years) with no psychiatric or neurological 
illness and normal or corrected vision. Two additional participants were 
tested but not analysed due to a technical malfunction (corrupted data 
files). Ethical approval was received from Birkbeck, University of 
London. Sample size was determined on the basis of pilot testing. A 
separate pilot experiment found illusions of control in agency judge-
ments (c  <  0) with an effect size of d = 1.02 (95% CI: 0.54–1.49). A 
sample of 48 participants therefore provides > 90% power to detect 
effects at least as large as the lower bound of this interval. 
2.2. Procedure 
The task was run in MATLAB using Cogent 2000. Participants sat 
~60 cm from a monitor, wearing a pair of glasses which selectively 
occluded view of their hands. Participants' hands were placed above an 
infrared motion tracker that recorded their actions. At the beginning of 
each trial participants viewed a white dot cursor that tracked the po-
sition of their palm and were required to move this dot into a start zone 
(demarcated by a wedge). After remaining in the start zone for 
2000 ms, a ‘bagel’ shape appeared on screen. Participants were in-
structed to execute an anti-clockwise circular hand rotation (Fig. 1a). 
They were informed that on ‘control’ trials (50%) the dot would follow 
the trajectory of the participant's hand rotation, whereas on ‘no control’ 
trials (50%) the dot trajectory would be controlled by the computer, 
and were made aware that both trial types were equally likely. On ‘no 
control’ trials, the dot was animated with a movement trajectory from a 
previous trial, randomly-selected with replacement, once participants 
began to move. Stimulus presentation lasted for 2000 ms, and partici-
pants were trained to produce approximately one full rotation in this 
period. If the observed cursor moved outside the ‘bagel’ (regardless of 
trial type) participants received error feedback, judgements were not 
elicited and the trial was later repeated. This ensured that participants' 
agency judgements were not influenced by the success or failure of the 
intended movement (c.f. Oishi et al., 2018). Otherwise participants 
were presented with a question screen to judge whether they did or did 
not control the trajectory of the dot (responding with their left thumb). 
The main task comprised 300 trials in a randomised order, with breaks 
every 20 trials. 
3. Results 
3.1. Signal detection analyses: do agents experience illusions of control? 
On each trial, the cursor was either yoked to the participant's action 
(‘control’ trials) or programmed to follow an independent trajectory 
from a previous trial (‘no control’ trials). Participants judged whether 
they controlled the trajectory of the observed dot. Standard signal de-
tection theoretic measures (Green & Swets, 1966) of sensitivity (d′) and 
bias (c) were calculated from hit rates (proportion of ‘agency’ responses 
on control trials: mean [sd] = 0.88 [0.11]) and false alarm rates 
(proportion of ‘agency’ responses on no control trials: mean 
[SD] = 0.36 [0.21]). Broadly, d′ reflects the extent to which partici-
pants are more likely to report control on control trials than no control 
trials, and c measures whether they exhibit a generalised tendency to 
report control regardless of trial type (see Supplementary Methods for 
precise calculations). This analysis found that participants could dis-
criminate between ‘control’ and ‘no control’ trials (mean d′ = 1.24, one 
sample t47 = 16.66, p  <  .001, d = 2.41; Fig. 1b), but also showed a 
bias to report agency regardless of trial type (mean c = −0.71, one 
sample t47 = 6.94, p  <  .001, d = 1.0; Fig. 1b). This latter finding 
suggests that our paradigm induces robust ‘illusions of control’, but 
unlike most previous work, using a paradigm that actually allows se-
paration of sensitivity from bias. 
3.2. Reverse correlation: are agents sensitive to spurious correlations? 
We subsequently used reverse correlation (Wyart et al., 2012) to 
examine whether sensitivity to correlations could in fact account for 
bias as well as sensitivity effects. Specifically, signal detection analyses 
separate overarching biases from sensitivity by comparing the tendency 
to give a certain response (‘control’) regardless of trial type, and more 
readily for the control than no control trials, respectively. However, this 
blunt separation does not account for the fact that no control trials 
differ from each other in the extent to which they resemble control 
trials, and therefore both sensitivity and bias effects can in principle 
arise from signal sensitivity. For each trial we computed the spatio-
temporal cross-correlation between the observed and executed motion 
trajectories. Logistic functions fit to each participant used trial-wise 
cross-correlation values to predict trial-wise responses (i.e. ‘agency’ or 
‘no agency’; see Fig. 2). 
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The slopes of these functions (β1) reflect the weight given to cor-
relations when making judgements. These values were positive (mean 
β1 = 19.58, t47 = 11.24, p  <  .001, d = 1.62), suggesting – perhaps 
unsurprisingly – that the likelihood of reporting agency increases as the 
random noise spuriously resembling the target increases. In other 
words, this value confirms that agents are sensitive to incidental cor-
relations between actions and outcomes when making agency judge-
ments. The constant of these functions (β0) captures any general bias to 
pick either response. A strong prediction of the grandiosity account – 
that agents are biased to overestimate control irrespective of objective 
facts – is that this parameter should be positive, indicating a general 
tendency towards agency regardless of facts. In fact, we found that 
these values were negative, suggesting that participants were not gen-
erally biased to report ‘agency’ regardless of correlations (mean 
β0 = −17.79, t47 = 10.38, p  <  .001, d = 1.50). It is worth noting that 
the same effects on β1 (t47 = 10.64, p  <  .001) and β0 values 
(t47 = 10.60, p  <  .001) were obtained for functions modelled only to 
‘no control’ trials. However, we should perhaps not draw strong con-
clusions from this negative value, because correlations were typically 
positive (see Fig. 2c) and participants likely believed that they should 
often report no control. Under these task constraints a positive value 
may have been unlikely. We therefore incorporate modelling analyses 
in the following section that corroborate the proof-of-concept that in 
principle ‘illusions of control’ could arise purely through sensitivity to 
incidental correlations. 
3.3. Computational modelling: does a sensitive agent experience illusions of 
control? 
To confirm that sensitivity to correlations alone could generate il-
lusions of control, we first used these modelled logistic functions to 
simulate detection performance for hypothetical trials. To this end we 
took 300 random pairs of observed and executed trajectories from each 
participant's real data and calculated the spatiotemporal cross-correla-
tion that would have been obtained on these hypothetical trials. These 
values were fed into the participant's modelled function to simulate a 
false alarm rate (i.e. probability of responding ‘agency’). Hit rates were 
simulated similarly from a hypothetical trial where observed and exe-
cuted movements were fully dependent (cross-correlation = 1). These 
simulated data (see Fig. 2d) showed the same tendency to report agency 
regardless of trial type (mean c = −0.22, one sample t47 = 2.54, 
p = .015, d = 0.366). Therefore, illusory experiences of control can be 
generated by underlying functions with no evidence-independent bias 
towards reporting agency. 
Second, as already noted, we perhaps should not draw strong con-
clusions about the nature of the intercept effect in this paradigm. Other 
methods may provide a more powerful proof-of-concept that in prin-
ciple ‘illusory’ control can arise purely through sensitivity to objective 
action-outcome relationships. To this end, we compared the sensitivity 
hypothesis and grandiosity hypothesis by modelling the agent's decision 
process under the drift diffusion model. Notably, the grandiosity hy-
pothesis accommodates the fact that one is sensitive to correlations but 
assumes additional overarching biases that shift the likelihood of re-
porting control. Drift diffusion models conceptualise two-choice deci-
sions (e.g. ‘am I in control?’) as a noisy process of evidence accumu-
lation towards a decision boundary (Ratcliff et al., 2016). Evidence is 
sampled by decision units and when enough evidence has been accu-
mulated to reach a decision boundary, the appropriate response is 
triggered. The evidence accumulation process is based upon units re-
presenting evidence, even if the physical events themselves have ter-
minated by the start of the response window. We created two models – 
a sensitive agent model and a grandiose agent model. In the sensitive agent 
model (Fig. 3a) evidence accumulation (v) on ‘no control’ trials was 
determined by the incidental correlation between observed and exe-
cuted motion trajectories. Under this model, agents would be more 
likely to respond ‘agency’ in the presence of stronger incidental corre-
lations, and more likely to respond ‘no agency’ when correlations are 
weaker. According to the sensitivity hypothesis, the strength of this 
coupling between evidence accumulation and incidental correlations 
(v ~ correlation) determines whether an agent will experience illusions 
Fig. 1. Motion tracking task and signal detection results: a) Participants performed counter-clockwise hand movements and observed similar movements onscreen. 
They were asked at the end of each trial whether their action controlled the trajectory of the observed dot. Sometimes these onscreen movements were entirely yoked 
to the participant's movements and were therefore controlled by them (‘control’ trials). Sometimes they were trajectories from previous trials and therefore parti-
cipants did not control them (‘no control’ trials). b) Signal detection analyses revealed that participants were more likely to say they controlled the cursor movement 
on control trials relative to no control trials (sensitivity - d′), and were also more likely than not to report being in control regardless of trial type (bias - c; lower, 
negative values reflective of an illusion of control). Raincloud plots display probability density estimates (upper) and box and scatter plots (lower). Boxes denote 
lower, middle and upper quartiles, whiskers denote 1.5 interquartile range, and scattered dots denote individual participant datapoints (N = 48). Raincloud plots 
devised by Allen et al. (2019). 
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of control. The grandiose agent model (Fig. 3b) was identical to the 
sensitive agent but included an additional free-parameter – the start- 
point of the accumulation process (z). Changes in the start-point reflect 
general biases towards one kind of response irrespective of the evidence 
received. For example, under the grandiosity hypothesis one would 
expect agents to shift their start-point nearer to the ‘respond agency’ 
boundary, reflecting a general tendency to over-report one's control 
over external events, and shifts in this parameter would explain illu-
sions of control. We fit both of these models to our data to determine 
whether ‘false alarms’ in our task were best described by a sensitive agent 
or grandiose agent model. Each model was specified and estimated using 
the hDDM package, which uses a hierarchical Bayesian modelling ap-
proach to estimate simultaneously group-level and subject-specific 
parameters (Wiecki et al., 2013). 
We simulated data from the sensitive agent and grandiose agent 
models to determine how well these recovered patterns in our data. 
Simulations were conducted using the hDDM package, using the pos-
terior distribution of parameter estimates to generate 3000 simulated 
decisions for each trial for each participant. For each trial, we calcu-
lated the proportion of simulated decisions where the ‘agency’ response 
was given, i.e., the probability of a false alarm. Averaging these trial- 
wise probabilities across all trials allowed us to compute a simulated 
false alarm rate for each participant. This procedure was performed 
separately for each model, yielding a simulated false alarm rate for the 
sensitive agent and grandiose agent model for each participant. 
Inspecting the group-level parameter estimates for the sensitive agent 
model suggested that agents did indeed couple evidence accumulation 
to experienced correlations (mean v ~ correlation: 2.02). Moreover, we 
found a strong relationship between the weight an individual partici-
pant gave to incidental correlations and their experience of illusory 
control (r48 = −0.585, p  <  .001; see Fig. 3d). More importantly, using 
a stepwise linear regression, we determined how well these simulated 
false alarm rates captured true false alarm rates, and whether any ad-
ditional variance was explained by the grandiose agent model. In the 
first step, we used simulated false alarm rates for the simpler sensitive 
agent model to predict empirical illusions of control (c values) experi-
enced by each participant. This model was highly significant 
(R2 = 0.665, F1,46 = 91.37, p  <  .001), with false alarm rates from the 
sensitive agent strongly predicting the empirically obtained illusions. In 
the second step, we included simulated false alarm rates from the 
grandiose agent model as an additional predictor of empirical illusions of 
control. While the regression model remained highly significant 
Fig. 2. Calculating sensitivity to incidental correlations and simulating illusions: In this task (a) there are random fluctuations in the correspondence between action- 
outcomes on ‘no control’ trials that can be quantified by cross-correlation (b). Reverse correlation techniques found that participants were sensitive to these spurious 
correlations (c) and data simulated only from sensitivity to these correlations (red diamonds) recreated the ‘illusions of control’ seen on real trials (blue circles; both 
N = 48 d). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 
D. Yon, et al.   Cognition 205 (2020) 104429
4
(R2 = 0.669, F2,45 = 45.54, p  <  .001), this analysis found no sig-
nificant improvement in model fit when this additional predictor was 
included (F1, 45 = 0.568, p = .455). This pattern suggests that the 
tendency to report ‘illusory control’ is well-explained by the simpler 
sensitive agent model, and that no additional variance in participant 
decisions is explained by the more complex grandiose agent model that 
incorporates evidence-independent biases. 
4. Discussion 
We found that agents experienced robust illusions of control – fre-
quently reporting agency over events that they did not truly influence. 
However, reverse correlation analysis revealed that these judgements 
reflected sensitivity to incidental correlations between actions and 
outcomes, and simulations showed that this sensitivity – without any 
additional biases – was sufficient to generate illusions of control. 
These results demonstrate that illusions of control may not imply 
grandiose beliefs about our capabilities that disregard objective evi-
dence (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Presson & Benassi, 2003). They in fact 
allow us to conceptualise illusions of control in line with other findings 
where we are highly sensitive to variations in the contingency between 
our actions and their outcomes (Dickinson et al., 1984; Elsner & 
Hommel, 2004; Moore et al., 2009; Moore & Haggard, 2008). They are 
also consistent with recent findings from perceptual decision making 
where biases to report seeing signals in noise can reflect spurious sig-
nals rather than complete hallucinations (Wyart et al., 2012). In other 
words, we find that an observer frequently experiences an ‘illusion’ that 
they controlled the environment when incidental correlations hold 
between what they do and what they see. These data suggest these 
experiences are ‘illusory’ in one sense but not in another – agents as-
cribe agency when there truly is none, but they do not necessarily make 
these subjective ascriptions without objective evidence. 
The illusory claims are typically made based because individuals 
report control when events are not in fact caused by actions, e.g., when 
the occurrence of lightbulb flashes in an experiment is in fact de-
termined randomly (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) or traffic lights are 
controlled by timers. The paradigms typically examine how often 
agency is reported, or implicit correlates of agency are found, when one 
was not in control. They do not separate sensitivity from bias. More 
importantly, the precise contingencies are not usually calculated and 
the experienced correlations are likely to be above zero. For example, 
‘no control’ settings in laboratory paradigms usually present sensory 
events (e.g., lightbulb flashes) that are more frequent in the presence of 
action, even if the precise temporal relationship is modulated. Simi-
larly, if we always press the placebo button at pre-programmed traffic 
lights, the lights will never change without the press. It is therefore 
critical to establish true action-outcome contingencies if wishing to 
make claims about the extent to which these contingencies do or do not 
Fig. 3. Computational modelling and links to illu-
sions of control: a) An illustration of the ‘sensitive 
agent’ model, where the decision process is coupled 
to the incidental correlation experienced between 
actions and outcomes. b) An illustration of the 
‘grandiose agent’ model, which is identical to the 
‘sensitive agent’ apart from the fact that the start- 
point of the accumulation process can also be shifted 
towards one response or another. c) Posterior prob-
ability estimates for group-level parameter v ~ cor-
relation. The v ~ correlation parameter, describes 
the coupling between decisions and incidental cor-
relations between executed and observed motion 
trajectories, where positive values indicate a ten-
dency to respond ‘agency’ when these correlations 
are higher. d) Relationship between subject-specific 
v ~ correlation values and empirical illusions of 
control (c values). Lower c values indicate stronger 
illusions of control. 
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determine one's sense of agency. 
We have provided a proof-of-concept for how illusory control could 
result from sensitivity to objective relationships but future work must 
establish whether it always does and whether other factors influence 
these illusions. First, these effects may depend upon the proportion of 
control relative to no control trials. The magnitude of biases may ra-
tionally increase with the number of control trials, but equally could 
decrease if participants believe they should give a substantial number of 
‘no control’ responses. Second, it has previously been argued that ‘il-
lusions of control’ are higher when the probability of action is higher 
(Yarritu et al., 2014), and therefore that we may exhibit biases to 
perceive frequent actions as more related to random outcomes. It would 
be interesting to examine whether this bias results from higher in-
cidental correlations when more actions are performed. Third, some 
illusions of control may appear to result even when no action outcomes 
are experienced. For instance, classic studies reported grandiose beliefs 
about winning a card game before outcomes are known (Langer, 1975). 
In principle these effects may be governed by past action-outcome 
contingencies, but they may instead suggest that grandiose assumptions 
do influence beliefs about control in certain circumstances. Regardless 
of the outcome of future work, the critical finding from our proof-of- 
concept study is that ‘illusions of control’ can arise purely through 
unbiased sensitivity to objective relationships – a logical point that 
appears to have been missed by some when theorising about their 
possible adaptive value – not that they necessarily always will. Indeed, 
one possibility to test in future work is that expectations may ‘tune’ 
agents to different kinds of evidence about control in the same way that 
expectations bias the gain we afford to the predicted sensory con-
sequences of an action (Yon et al., in press). 
These findings could prompt us to think differently about popula-
tions who display atypical illusions of control. For example, attenuated 
illusions of control in depression have prompted claims that these pa-
tients possess a ‘sadder but wiser’ view of their capabilities (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979). However, this idea may need revisiting if illusions 
can reflect a high sensitivity to weak action-outcome relationships ra-
ther than a disregard for evidence. Specifically, ‘depressive realism’ 
could reflect a reduced sensitivity to weak correlations between actions 
and outcomes – consistent with evidence that depression is associated 
with difficulties in tracking contingencies between actions and rewards 
(Chase et al., 2010). The framework described here may also prove 
useful in determining whether other apparent biases in the sense of 
agency arise due to global biases in decision making, or changes in 
sensitivity to incidental correlations. For example, the experience of 
agency is relatively exaggerated for positive over negative outcomes 
(Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). Such findings could 
reflect self-serving biases where agents take credit for good con-
sequences. Alternatively, they could also arise if agents are more sen-
sitive to incidental correlations between actions and positive outcomes 
(e.g. because they attend to them). 
An important feature of judgements of control is that objective 
evidence ranges from perfect independence between action and out-
come (correlation = 0) to perfect dependency (correlation = 1). By 
analogy to studies of perception, this means judgements of control are 
less like discriminations (e.g., is this line tilted left or right?) where 
observers can in principle process both positive and negative evidence 
for a particular outcome, and more like detection tasks (e.g., was there 
a line or not?). Intriguingly, observers in perceptual tasks tend to have 
poorer insight into their ability to judge absence over presence (Kanai 
et al., 2010; Meuwese et al., 2014), possibly because the former places 
particular demands on metacognitive self-monitoring mechanisms 
(Mazor et al., 2020). This asymmetry may have important implications 
for how agents actively monitor what they cannot control in certain 
kinds of environments (Wen et al., 2020). 
A key question our data raise is whether high sensitivity to im-
perfect correlations makes our sense of agency more or less veridical in 
natural environments. This question is difficult to answer given the 
substantial variability in the absolute correlations we experience when 
we are truly in control. While there is a close to perfect correlation 
between our actions and the direct movement of our body, the influence 
we have on a temperamental friend or an uncooperative coffee machine 
may be considerably weaker. An important challenge will be to mea-
sure the correlations that occur between actions and different kinds of 
events in natural settings to assess whether human observers calibrate 
the weight they give to experienced correlations to this expected range. 
These types of measurement will be especially important in de-
termining whether these biases are present in most healthy individuals 
because feeling in control in the face of imperfect correlations may be 
appropriate in many environments. Indeed, those who persevere with 
an unresponsive coffee machine or temperamental friend may often 
enjoy a fitness advantage but not because they are ‘unrealistically op-
timistic’ (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Bandura, 2002; Haselton & Nettle, 
2006; Johnson & Fowler, 2011; Presson & Benassi, 2003; Vázquez, 
1987). Their actions may in fact influence the world but with an im-
perfect contingency. Expecting true agency to be associated with per-
fect action-outcome contingencies may indeed be maladaptive (e.g., 
depression), as previously assumed, but may in fact reflect a less wise, 
rather than wiser, appraisal of our ability to influence the world around 
us. 
In conclusion, our results demonstrate that illusions of control can 
arise because agents are exquisitely sensitive to the relationships be-
tween actions and effects in an imperfect world and pick up on those 
that occur purely by chance. 
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